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Several  analyses  show  that  regional  capital  incentives  induce  additional  investment  and 
growth (Schalk and Untiedt, 2000). The impact of capital subsidies on employment is more 
doubtful, even if many studies found that the substitution effect outweighs the output effect 
(Gabe  and  Kraybill,  2002).  However,  the  spatial  effects  of  capital  subsidies  on  local 
development are generally neglected. In a recent paper (De Castris and Pellegrini, 2005) we 
show that several industrial policies have a strong spatial dimension. This study analyzes the 
presence of spill-overs generated by subsidised firms, disentangling the effects due to the 
economic links across areas. The identification strategy is based on the introduction of  spatial 
externalities in the spatial autoregressive model (Anselin, 2003). The presence of specific 
spatial effects of subsidies is tested on the reduced form of the model, evaluating the implicit 
common  factor  restriction.  The  empirical  analysis  considers  subsidies  allocated  by  Law 
488/1992, the main regional policy in Italy, in the Southern regions of the country in the 
period  1996-2001.  A  difference-in-difference  estimator  across  365  subsidised  and  not 
subsidised  local  labour  systems  is  applied.  The  results  suggest  the  presence  of  a  modest 




JEL code: J23, R58, R11  









We are grateful to participants at seminars in Florence, Rome and at the 47th European Congress of the Regional 
Science Association, Paris, 2007, where an earlier version of the paper was presented, for helpful discussions 
and suggestions. We thank also an anonymous referee for useful comments. However, we bear full responsibility  
for any remaining errors. Founding from Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca scientifica e Tecnologica, 
Research  Project  PRIN  “Statistical  methods  for  the  evaluation  of  educational,  training,  and  development 
policies” is gratefully acknowledged.  Although jointly planned, paragraphs 1, 2, have been written by Guido 
Pellegrini and paragraphs 3,4,5 by Marusca De Castris.   2 
1. Introduction 
 
State  aids  to  private  firms  have  been  a  key  component  of  regional  policy  in  European 
countries. The use of such policy instruments has been aimed at influencing the regional 
allocation  of  investments  and  employment,  in  order  to  increase  competitiveness,  self-
sustaining growth, and new employment in low income regions. In Italy several measures for 
local development are oriented to private capital subsidies. The main policy instrument to 
boost private investments has been Law 488/1992. From 1996 (the first operative year) to 
2007, this law has sustained more than 30,000 investment projects with over 17 billions of 
Euros of subsidies, whereas investments have added up to over 56 billions of Euros, 70% of 
which in the South.  
 
The debate over the overall effects of  investment subsidies is extensive. Several papers show 
that  capital  incentives  induce  additional  investment  (Faini  and  Schiantarelli,  1987;  Harris 
RID,  1991;  Daly  et  al.,  1993;  Schalk  and  Untiedt,  2000),  even  if  they  can  have  some 
unpleasant effects on income inequality across different areas (Dupont and Martin, 2003). 
Besides,  they  have  some  effect  in  attracting  plants  to  low  income  areas  (Faini  and 
Schiantarelli, 1987; Midelfart-Knarvik, K.H. & Overman H. G., 2002). The theoretical effect 
of  capital subsidies on employment depend on the size of substitution effect, associated to the 
reduction in the user cost of capital relative to the labour cost, and the size of the output 
effect, related to the increase in production (and therefore in local labour demand), due to the 
reduction  in  total  costs  and  to  the  attraction  of  new  investment  in  the  area  (Schalk  and 
Untiedt, 2000). Several studies found that the substitution effect outweighs the output effect 
(Driehuis and  van den Noord, 1988; Harris RID, 1991; Gabe and Kraybill 2002), others 
found the opposite (Wren and Waterson, 1991; Daly et al., 1993; Schalk and Untiedt, 2000; 
Roper  and  Hewitt-Dundas,  2001).  All  the  studies  show  that  the  effects  of  subsidies  on 
efficiency and productivity are negligible or negative (Lee, 1996; Bergstrom, 1998; Harris 
and Trainor, 2005). 
On  the  contrary,  the  literature  about  the  quantitative  evaluation  of  regional  effects  of 
industrial aid schemes is not very wide. Some studies, encouraged  by data availability, used 
statistical methods to evaluate the impact of Enterprise Zone Programs, US incentive schemes 
to firms located in disadvantaged areas (for example Bondonio, 2000; Bondonio, Engberg, 
1999;  Boarnet,  Bogart,  1996;  Brintnall,  Green,  1988;  Dowall,  1996;  Erickson,  Friedman, 
1990a, 1990b, Papke, 1994; Talbot, 1988). Recent papers on regional effects of  industrial   3 
subsidies  in  Italy  are  Bondonio  (2004),  that  evaluates  the  regional  impact  of  different 
incentives  in  the  areas  Objective  2  (of  EU  classification),  and  De  Castris  and  Pellegrini 
(2005), that show the regional impact of different policy instruments (Law 488/1992 and 
“Contratti di programma”). Bondonio (2004) points out the presence of very low regional 
impacts of subsidies, whereas De Castris and Pellegrini (2005) detect moderate, positive and 
statistical significant regional effects of incentives.  However, the presence of spatial pattern 
in industrial subsidies has been analyzed only in De Castris and Pellegrini (2005). 
 
The lack of an extensive literature on spatial effect of incentives is rather curious, because 
several  industrial policies, especially the industrial policies oriented to the growth of regional 
underdeveloped regions, have the purpose to generate spatial externalities. Regional industrial 
policies  promote  local  aggregations  of  firms,  generating  positive  local  agglomeration 
externalities, spatial externalities or spillovers
1. A summary of the rationale for the supply of  
localization tax incentives is presented in Glaeser ( 2001), that lists: 
a.  Externalities linked to the demand and supply of goods and services; 
b.  Agglomeration externalities, due to income production generates ex post high regional 
public income by local taxes; 
c.  Ex post appropriation. The firm’s fixed resources create an immobility which means 
that it is easy prey for a taxing authority. Forward-looking firms recognize this fact 
and demand up-front tax breaks to compensate for-ex post appropriation; 
d.  Tax discrimination for attracting firms in presence of  firms with different levels of 
demand for different locations. Local governments will charge different tax rates ( and 
will give tax incentives) to different firms depending on how much they want to locate 
in the region; 
e.  Corruption and influence. Tax incentives reflect the ability of the firm to bribe or 
coerce the leaders of the local government. 
 
The survey proposed in Glaeser (2001) suggests that tax incentives almost surely improve the 
efficiency of the locational decisions of firms. The only case where this is not true occurs 
when  tax  incentives  are  driven  by  corruption  and  influence.  However,  the  empirical 
measurement of the spatial effects of  the industrial subsidies is not easy task. If incentives are 
effective in generating spatial externalities and spatial spillovers, they should be empirically 
                                                 
1 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a recent review on agglomeration economies. See also Garcia-Mila and 
McGuire (2002).   4 
measured by the presence of a positive spatial correlation in some outcome variables (like 
regional value added, production, employment) (De Castris and Pellegrini, 2005). Moreover, 
the localization of the subsidized firms should follow a positive spatial correlation pattern. 
Nevertheless,  the  subsidized  firms  could  replace  firms  and  investments  project  in  the 
neighbouring areas, by a spatial crowding out effect in the input, output and in the labour 
markets.  These  effects  could  decreases  the  spatial  positive  correlation.  The  net  effect  on 
spatial  correlation  is  therefore  undetermined,  even  if  the  empirical  spatial  distribution  of 
subsidies suggests a overall positive effect. 
 
The presence of such positive effects is basically an empirical matter. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to identify and evaluate the net spatial effects of subsidies considering incentives’ 
spillovers between areas. The outcome variable is employment, as a measure of economic 
performance of the area. The estimated effects include both the impact of specific instruments 
on regional outcome, evaluated here in terms of creation of new jobs, as well as the effect of 
spatial  linkages  across  neighbouring  areas.  Our  analysis  intends  to  identify  and  to 
discriminate the two different effects.  
 
This is the main innovation presented in the paper. The empirical measurement of the spatial 
effect is affected by a spatial identification problem: the spillover effect generated by the 
incentives should be disentangled  from the spatial attraction across neighbouring areas that 
cannot be attributed to incentives. For instance, spatial shocks spread across areas with a 
positive spatial correlation (if income increase in such area then it has also a positive impact 
on neighbouring areas). We are unaware of any examples of an empirical specification of the 
spatial identification problem in the literature. Therefore we propose an econometric approach 
that  uses  a  spatial  common  factor  restriction  in  order  to  identify  the  spatial  effects  of 
industrial subsidies.  
 
The analysis is carried out at disaggregated territorial level, using the grid of the local labour 
system (LLS, territorial unit) in the South of Italy. This allows the spatial analysis of the 
spillover  effects  between  LLS  that  are  estimated  by  an  econometric  model  with  spatial 
dependence.  
 
The  paper  is  divided  into  the  following  parts:  in  the  second  section  we  illustrate  the 
methodological aspects of our analysis and describe the spatial econometric model we used;   5 
in the third section a brief review of the incentive scheme (Law 488/92) under analysis is 
presented; in the fourth section the analysis of the spatial distribution of the instruments, 
evaluating  overlapping,  concentration  and  spatial  correlation,  is  described,  and  data  and 
statistical source are presented. In the following one we show the results of our estimate, 
explaining  the  spatial  impact  of  the  instrument.  The  last  section  is  dedicated  to  the 
conclusions of our analysis. 
 
2. Methodology for evaluating subsidies spatial effects  
 
The  methodology  for  evaluating  spatial  effects  of  subsidies  on  a  region  is  based  on  the 
analysis of the spatial model, following the recent literature on the subject (Anselin, 2003).  
 
We meet three main problems that affect the evaluation of the spatial impact of the incentives:  
1.  identifying the effects of incentives in presence of a selection bias; 
2.  evaluating the impact of different level of subsidization across LLS; 
3.  specifying the effect of incentives in presence of spatial interactions across areas. 
 
The first problem is related to the presence of auto-selection: the subsidized firms choose to 
localize in areas where perspectives are higher; therefore larger growth could be caused not 
by the incentives but also by the idiosyncratic features of these areas. In this case we can use 
econometric  strategies  based  on  the  knowledge  of  observable  and  non  observable  auto-
selection variables to remove the selection bias and find the correct impact coefficient. In the 
case of selection on non observable variables (considered constant in the period) the standard 
model is the difference in differences estimator
2: the analysis compares the difference of the 
outcome variable before and after the intervention (instead that its level), across subsidized 
and not subsidized areas. In our case the simple differences could be misleading because LLS 
have  different  extension  (and  therefore  different  employment  levels).  We  use  logarithmic 
differences, i.e. the growth rate of employment. The growth rates differentials are attributed to 
the features of each LLS, in particular the degree of structural development level and cyclical 
variables. These features can be approximated by a set of covariates considered in the model. 
 
                                                 
2 See  Blundell R. and Costa Dias M. (2000) and (2003) a technical description.   6 
The second problem is related to the choice of the correct parameterization of the intervention 
variable. The use of a simple flag to single out areas with or without incentive, as often used 
in the literature, is not adequate, because the high variability across LLS of the amount of 
subsidies. Moreover, the set of not subsidized LLS by Law 488/92 incentives is very poor (33 
over 365, less than 10%).  
 
Given the available data, the dimension of the subsidized investment has be approximated by 
the number of new workers, a proxy of the amount of the intervention realized, under the 
hypothesis of a linear relation between the number of new jobs and substitution effects or 
complementarities  on  the  area
3.  The  use  of  logarithmic  differences  requires  that  the 
dimensional  effect  has  to  be  eliminated.  Therefore  the  units  of  new  created  jobs  are 
normalized by total employment in the LLS before intervention. The interpretation of the 
coefficient of the intervention variable is facilitated: it represents the additional employees 
units in the LLS succeeding an increase of one unit in the employees pool due to subsidies. In 
the econometric analysis a LLS is select as “subsidized” only if the share of new employment 
generated by the subsidized projects is over 5%. Under this condition the subsidized LLS by 
Law 488/92 are around the 48% of the total. 
 
Probably  the  most  important  problem  in  the  specification  of  the  evaluation  model  is  the 
presence of a high spatial correlation across LLS that could influence the spillover effects’ 
estimates. This correlation could be representative of a specific territorial development model 
that has to be included in the analysis. Our approach, based on the suggested econometric 
spatial  externalities  specification  by  Anselin  (2003),  considers  the  presence  of  spatial 
externalities that are not explicitly modelled, but are, in the Anselin’s jargon “unmodeled”. 
From the econometric point of view, the approach is to include the externalities in the error 
spatial term. Therefore any spatial patterns in the dependent variable we consider would be 
reflected in the error terms. The basic model is therefore the spatial autoregressive model 
(Anselin, 2003). 
 
The general model, with policy effect, is therefore specified by:  
 
 (1)        y  = α +  Xβ  + δ Int + ε 
                                                 
3 We test the presence of non linear relation by a COSUM test.   7 
(2)          ε = λW ε + u 
where y is a N by 1 vector of observations related to the outcome variable (log of the total 
employment by LLS), and N=365, X  is a matrix of N by k observations of k covariates, Int 
(public intervention) is the N by 1 vector of observations related to new employment created 
by Law 488/92 intervention (normalized by total employment), α  is a Nx1 vector of LLS 
specific  fixed  effect  by  LLS, β  is  a  k  by  1  vector  of  parameters  and  δ    is  a  scalar  that 
represents  the  impact  of  public  intervention  on  employment,  u  is  a  Nx1  vector  of 
homoschedastic not correlated and normal distributed errors with variance σ
2. W is the usual 
NxN spatial weights matrix
4 and λ is the spatial autoregressive parameter. 
In this model, a random shock in a specific region does not only affect employment of this 
region, but also has an impact on employment of all other regions through the same inverse 
spatial multiplier (I λW)
 1. 
 This is the general (global, following Anselin’s taxonomy) spatial spillovers effect across 
areas that is not directly dependent on subsidies. The reduced form solution is given by: 
(3)        y = α +  Xβ  + δ Int  + (I  λ W)
 1 u 
(4)        y  = (I  λ W)α +  λ W y +  Xβ    λ  W Xβ  +  δInt   λ δ W Int + u 
Note that the public intervention variable is inserted in the equation (4) twice: by its level 
values and also by its spatial lagged values, with different coefficients, as the other covariates. 
Therefore in the equation (4) a spatially lagged policy intervention variable is specified even 
if the incentive does not generate a spillover effect.    
Let now assume that there is a specific spillover effect τ W Int  related to the subsidies to be 
included in equation (4): 
 (4’)        y  =(I  λ W)α + λ W y +  Xβ    λ  W Xβ  +  δInt  + (τ λ δ) W Int + u 
The econometric specification of the model is the following: 
 
(5)  y = a1 W y + X a 2  + W X a 3  +  a 4 Int  + a 5W Int + u  
where  a 1 = λ ;  a 2 = β ;  a 3 =  -λ β ; a 4 = δ ;  a 5 = (τ λ δ) 
                                                 
4 In our case wij is equal to 1 if the distance between two centroids of LLS is less than 39 km, the average 
distance between the centroids, 0 otherwise.   8 
If there is not a specific subsidies spillover effect (τ = 0), the spatial spillover effects of the 
intervention variables are equal to the spatial spillover effects of all the covariates, and the 
spatial common factor restriction must hold: 
(6)        a 5 =    a 1 * a 4 
In this case, the policy spillover effects have to be attributed entirely to the general pattern of 
spatial autocorrelation across areas and not to specific policy effects. If instead τ  is different 
from 0, it can be estimated by (7): 
(7)    τ
*= a 5   (   a 1 * a 4) 
In this case the common factor restriction does not hold, and we measure a specific spillover 
effect that can be attributed to the policy intervention. Note that in this case the subsidy 
specific spillover impact (τ ) is different from the subsidy total spillover impact (a 5). 
The empirical specification of the model has to take into account the presence of regional 
fixed effects. The solution is given by differencing the outcome variable (log of employment 
by LLS). Therefore the outcome variable is the employment growth rate (period 1996-2001), 
and it is conditioned to the policy variable (share of new employment created by Law 488/92 
to total employment), controlling for a set of covariates, related to the initial condition of each 
LLS and to territorial cyclical dynamics, with a spatial error. The empirically specification 
basically uses a parametrically conditioned difference in difference estimator, controlling for 
observed differences in initial conditions
5. The model is estimated considering time t (after 
the policy intervention,) and time t-1 (before the policy intervention): 
 (8)  (ln y)t = a1 W  (ln y)t + a 21  (ln y) t 1+ a 22 X t 1+ a 3 WXt 1+ a 4 Int t + a 5W Int t + u t 
 
where W (ln y)t is the endogenous spatially lagged variable (the log of the LLS employment 
change), calculated as the matrix product of W and the employment growth rate for each LLS. 
a1 is the autoregressive spatial parameter that includes spatial independent effects. The model 
                                                 
5 In cases where data on observable pre-intervention variables that are differently distributed between treated and 
non-treated units are available, a more common estimator is the conditional difference-in-difference estimator 
with propensity score matching (CDD-PSM). The confounding factors are controlled for by a PSM design, 
which surpasses the difficulties of choosing the proper functional forms of the observable control variables 
(Bondonio, 2008). However, the CDD-PSM approach does not deal with spatial spillover, and it cannot be used 
in our estimate. The presence of confounding factor is controlled parametrically, specifying and testing an 
appropriate functional form of the covariates.     9 
controls  for  the  exogenous  temporally  lagged  employment  growth  rate     (ln  y)t 1  (period 
1991-1996). 
The  OLS  estimator  in  the  case  of  the  spatial  autoregressive  model,  where  the  dependent 
variable and other covariates are spatially lagged, is biased, even it is robust. A unbiased 
estimator is the instrumental variables estimator (2SLS), that is very sensitive to the model 
specification  and  to  the  instrument  chosen.  Both  are  member  of  the  k-class  family  of 
estimators. This family was introduced by Theil and it includes the OLS estimator (k = 0) and 
the 2SLS estimator (k = 1) as specific cases. The k-class family includes the LIML estimator. 
The  LIML  estimator  is  obtained  by  setting 
*, k λ =   where
* λ   is  the  smallest  root  of  the 
determinant equation |V1 – λ V|=0. In the determinant equation, V1 is the cross-product matrix 
of residuals from the OLS regression of the included endogenous variables on the included 
exogenous  variable,  and  V  is  the  cross-product  matrix  of  the  residuals  from  the  OLS 
regression  of  the  included  endogenous  on  all  the  exogenous  variables.  The  model  (8)  is 
estimated by 2SLS, and we use the OLS and the LIML estimators for a robustness test. 
 
3. An industrial aid scheme: the Law 488/92 
 
The empirical analysis in the paper is based on the subsidies allocated by Law 488/1992, a 
policy  instrument  oriented  to  sustain  the  accumulation  of  private  capital  and  to  support 
employment growth in the South of Italy.  In 1992, the Law 488/92 introduced a new way to 
allocate  subsidies  through  a  “rationing”  system  based  on  an  auction  mechanism  which 
guarantees compatibility of demand and supply of incentives. Subsidies are granted on the 
basis of the amount of the funding available. Interventions to be subsidised are selected on the 
basis of 3 indicators, in accordance with the policy targets
 6. The indicators are the following: 
1) share of owner capital invested in the project; 2) number of new employees per unit of 
investment; 3) ratio between the maximum subsidy which can be allocated and the amount of 
subsidies  requested  by  the  firm.  In  order  to  draw  up  rankings  to  grant  subsidies,  each 
application receives a score obtained by adding up the values of the single standardised and 
normalised indicators. The rankings are drawn up through the decreasing order of the score 
awarded to each project and the subsidies are allocated to projects until funding granted to 
                                                 
6 The selection process was based on three indicators in the period the empirical analysis refers to. After, two 
more indicators were added to them: an indicator linked to specific regional, sectorial or territorial priorities, and 
an indicator linked to the level of awareness of environmental issues.   10 
each region is exhausted. These rankings are constructed at a regional level. There are also 
special rankings for large projects and reserved lists for small and medium-sized firms.  
 
The amount of aids requested by the firm (with respect to threshold established by the European 
Union) affects the possibility of obtaining the incentive: lower the requested share of aid, higher 
the likelihood of receiving it. The mechanism allows firms to affect the probability of obtaining 
the subsidy and the State to reduce the “rent” granted to the firm. By ranking and selecting 
projects and subsidies, the government can stimulate projects with different earning capacities in 
different  ways  and  maximize  the  number  of  subsidised  investments  given  the  available  
resources.  
 
There are few studies concerning ex-post evaluation of the impact of  Law 488/92. A positive 
effect  of  Law  488/92  on  investment  is  found  in  Ministero  dell’Industria  (2000)  and  in 
Bronzini and de Blasio (2005). Pellegrini and Carlucci (2003) and Carlucci and Pellegrini 
(2005) show empirical evidence on a positive employment effect. Bronzini and de Blasio 
(2006)  indicate  the  presence  of  intertemporal  substitution:  financed  firms  slowdown 
significantly their investment activity in the years following the program. All the previous 
studies do not consider the spatial impact of the policy intervention. 
 
4. Territorial diffusion and concentration of the subsidies by Law 488/92 
 
The choice of Italian policy makers, to implement regional growth policies using the same 
map designed for the allowance of EU structural financial founds, has clearly affected the 
spatial distribution of incentives. The Law 488/92 has financed firms in both Northern and 
Southern regions of the country; however, the subsidy intensity was by far higher in the latter, 
following the map of aid delineated by the UE Commission. In our paper, we consider only 
incentives to the Southern regions, where the number of subsidized LLS is very high, and the 
capture of the spatial patterns is easier. In the nineties, we observe 784 LLS in Italy, 365 of 
which are in the Southern regions (Table 1). 
 
The spatial distribution of incentives by Law 488/92 was extensive: 332 (91%) of the 365    
LLS localized in the South received incentives by Law 488/92, i.e., they include at least one 
municipality where subsidized firms by Law 488/92 are located. On the contrary, only the 
55%  of  LLS  in  the  Centre  and  North  regions  was  subsidized.  The  process  of  firm   11 
subsidization was very intensive in the southern regions: ex post, in the nineties, any action of 
territorial concentration of the policy intervention in the South did not have any relevant 
effect. 
 
The  process  of  concentration  can  be  analyzed  also  by  the  exam  of  new  job  creation  by 
subsidized firms. On the whole, the policy instrument created 145,000 new jobs, more than 
2% of total industrial employment in 2001 of the whole country. However, the employment 
generated by Law 488/92 in the North-Centre (36,500 employees) represents only the 0.7% of 
industrial employment, while in the South (86,200 employees) the share is strongly higher 
(7.5%). 
 
 Table 1- Local labour systems by the presence/absence of subsidized firms (by Law  488/92) by 
region (period 1996-2001). 
 
Number of LLS by region 
Local Labour Systems  South  Italy 
No subsidy by Law 488/92  33  223 
Subsidized by Law 488/92  332  561 
Total  365  784 
 
 
The presence of a spatial pattern in the subsidies distribution can be detected by the analysis 
of spatial correlation, a standard statistical measure of spatial interactions. The indexes of 
spatial  autocorrelation  measure  the  influences  of  economic  and  social  phenomena  in  the 
space. In other word, the objective is to evaluate if an economic variable (X), observed in two 
(geographically) neighbouring areas, assumes on average similar or dissimilar values. The 
most used index Im  of spatial correlation, defined by Moran, has the following expression: 
 
(9)                                             
( ) ( )
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Where n is the number of observations;  ij w  (binary weight) is one element of the contiguity 
symmetric matrix [ ij w ] with null diagonal ( 0 = ii w ) and its value is equal to one if the area i 
and area j are contiguous, zero otherwise;  i x  are the values of the variables X for the i
th unit. 
   12 
The correlation analysis by Moran’s Im index in the regions of Southern Italy is presented in 
table 5. In general, the distribution of employment across LLS is clearly positively spatial 
correlated. We find also a positive and statistically significance spatial correlation of new 
employees created by Law 488/92.  The spatial correlation of new employees by subsidized 
firms is larger than the spatial correlation of employment. Therefore the degree of spatial 
agglomeration of Law 488/92 is higher than the average. These effects of agglomeration are a 
specific  characteristic  of  the  instrument  and  they  individuate  spillover  effects  between 
contiguous areas. 
 
Anselin  (1995)  demonstrate  that  the  Moran  index  of  global  autocorrelation  could  be 
decomposed into the sum of local Moran indexes. The analytical expression of local Moran 
index for a fixed space point is (Anselin, 1995): 
 
(10)                              ( )
) )( (
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where xi  is the value of the variable X at i ,  x  is the average of all observations of X, n is the 
number of the observations and N is the number of the contiguities of I; wij is  the element of 
contiguity symmetric matrix [wij], the values of wij are non zero when two locations are within 
a given distance of each other. The distance has been measured as the average of the distances 
between gravity centres of the LLS. All other values are zero included also those of each 
location distance with itself. The elements of the spatial weights matrix are row-standardized, 
such that for each i ,   1
1 = ∑ =
N
j ij w , and  S
2 can be formally expressed by: 
 


















Each index Ii for each location i represents only association between the value of x in location  
i and the values in the contiguous locations. The sum of Ii net of a proportional constant gives 
the global index of Moran. We can decompose it into two components, the first one related to 
the presence of local autocorrelation in the LLS where are localized subsidized firms, the 
second one for not subsidized: 
   13 
(12)                                                          I=Ii∈a +  Ii∈na                              
with 
(13)                                                      ( )
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where a is the set of subsidized LLS. The same chain rule for Ii∈,na  .  
In the last rows of the table 2 there are the estimated values of Ii∈a  for employment and their 
variation. We observe a spatial correlation higher than the average. The empirical evidence 
shows that the spatial distribution of subsidies is clearly spatially correlated: the subsidized 
firms tend to create a spatial agglomeration of employment, and therefore to generate positive 
externalities. Moreover, if we decompose the Moran I, the share of the index attributed to 
subsidized LLS is always higher than the share of the not subsidized LLS. 
 
Table 2 - Spatial correlation of employment (Moran’s I index by LLS) 
 
Variables  Moran’s I  Test z (normal) 
Employment 1991  0.065  2.46  
Employment 1996  0.071  2.65 
Employment 2001  0.074  2.75 
Employment Change 1996-01  0.082  3.05 
Employment Change 1991-96  0.002  0.18 
Subsidized LLS (flag)  0.10  3.78 
New employment  generated by Law 
488/92 
0.09  3.41 
Share of new employment  Law 488/92 on 
total employment 1996 
0.42  15.3 
Employment 1996: only subsidized LLS 
(decomposition) 
0.073  - 
Employment 2001: only subsidized LLS 
(decomposition) 
0.076  - 
Employment Change 1996-01: only 
subsidized LLS (decomposition) 





We estimated the regression model (8) on the 365 LLS in the South of Italy. The dependent 
variable is  total employment growth rate by LLS for the period (pre-post) 1996-2001.  
   
The  preliminary  results  of  the  OLS  estimate  indicates  a  significant  effect  of  the  policy 
intervention  (Table  3).  The  variable  related  to  the  new  jobs  created  by  Law  488/92    14 
normalized by employment in 1996, has a positive and significant coefficient, equal to 0.48. 
Therefore the model suggests that subsidies increase the total employment of about a half 
worker for each new job created. The transfer is not complete because the presence of a 
“substitution  effect”:  the  increase  of  employment  in  the  subsidized  firms  partially 
“substitutes”  job  that  could  be  created  also  in  absence  of  incentives.  The  net  impact  of 
subsidization on job creation is equal to half of the gross impact. Moreover, the dependent 
variable present a clear spatial dependence that it is not captured by the other covariates and 
should properly specified (Table 4). The testing procedure cannot discriminate between the 
spatial error and the spatial lag specification; however, the introduction of the spatial lagged 
dependent variable eliminates the spatial dependence in the model. 
In Table 5 we present the full estimation of the model, considering the spatial lag of the 
dependent variables and the covariates and using OLS, 2SLS e LIML estimators. For each 
model we test the spatial common factor restriction, i.e. the statistical significance of the 
difference between the coefficient of the spatial lag of the variable representing the level of 
subsidies and the coefficient related to the common spatial spillover effects. 
 
For the 2SLS and the LIML specification we instrumented the spatial lag of the dependent 
variables using as instrument: the lagged dependent variables, the share of agricultural value 
added and its spatial lag, the growth rate in service value added and its spatial lag, the spatial 
lag of the new employment of Law 488/92. In both cases the model satisfies the Sargan’s 
statistic (Anderson-Rubin statistic in the case of LIML) on over identifying restrictions and 
the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test of equation identification, i.e. that 
the excluded instruments are relevant. 
 
The spatial common factor restriction is rejected in all the three estimated models. Therefore 
we  observed  significant  spillover  effects  uniquely  related  to  the  subsidies.  A  simple 
evaluation of the subsidy specific spatial spillover effect shows that it is negative, quite small, 
included in the interval between -0.1 and -0.05. The results suggest the presence of a modest 
spatial crowding out effects of the subsidies: the increase in the subsidized employment (and 
investments) in a specific area reduces employment (and investments) in the neighbouring 
areas. The reason is that the subsidy reduces the cost of localization in the subsidized areas:  if 
the cost of changing location is sufficiently low, the firms have the incentive to move (or to 
create new establishments) to the subsidized areas.    15 
 
Table  3  –  Preliminary  OLS  estimate  of  model  (8)  (dependent  variable:  employment 
growth rate in the period 1996-2001; t-statistics in parentheses)  
 
Variables  MOD. 1  MOD. 2  MOD. 3 


































Spatial lag of employment growth rate  -  -  0.39 
(2.86) 
       
R
2  0.21  0.24  0.26 
Adjusted R
2   0.19  0.22  0.20 








Table 4 - Test of spatial dependence for model (8) 
 
Test of spatial dependence  MOD.1  MOD.2  MOD.3 
Spatial Error       






        
Spatial lag       






*p value between parentheses.   16 
 
Table 5 – Full model estimation (dependent variable: employment growth rate in the 
period 1996-2001; t-statistics in parentheses)  
 
 
Variables  OLS  IV  LIML 
















































τ   0.09   0.06   0.06 
R
2  0.26  0.26  0.24 







In this paper we have focused on the evaluation of spatial effects of Law 488/92, the main 
policy instruments devoted to private capital accumulation in the South of Italy. The analysis 
is based on a non experimental statistical methods applied to a very disaggregated territorial 
grid.  A  spatial  difference in difference  model  is  estimated  using  different  econometric 
methods, taking into account the diffusion of territorial spillovers across neighbouring areas. 
The identification strategy of the subsidies territorial effects is based on the introduction of  
spatial  externalities  in  the  spatial  autoregressive  model  (Anselin,  2003).  The  presence  of 
specific spatial effects of subsidies is tested on the reduced form of the model, evaluating the 
implicit common factor restriction. 
   17 
Restricting the impact analysis of public subsidies to regional employment, we argued that the 
effect of the policy intervention is twofold: on one side, there is a direct effect on subsidized 
firms.  The  sign  of  the  impact  is  generally  positive,  the  output  effect  outweighing  the 
substitution effect; on the other side, there is a crowding out effect across firms in the same 
area  and  across  neighbouring  areas.  We  proposed  a  new  methodological  approach  to  the 
evaluation of the spatial crowding out.  The identification of the net crowding out spatial 
effect is based on the spatial common factor restriction applied to the subsidies spillover 
effects.  The  methodology  allows  disentangling  the  spatial  spillovers  generated  by  the 
subsidies to the spillovers attributed to the generic attraction effect between neighbouring 
areas. 
The  empirical  application  to  subsidies  financed  by  Law  488/92  shows  the  presence  of  a 
significant, even if modest, crowding out effect. Therefore, the policy intervention affects the 
location  of  the  new  investments,  increasing  the  share  of  new  employment  localized  in 
subsidized areas. The attraction of new investments from richest regions to the poorest ones is 
exactly the effect pursued by the policy maker. The question is if the subsidies lead to an 
efficient location of the firms or to spatial distortions, where the subsidies distort the decisions 
of firms. Glaeser (2001) argues that an efficient location means that firms choose location in 
such a way that maximizes total social surplus: “the benefits of a firm moving to a particular 
location should include the profits that the firm earns from the location, any external effects, 
and the consumer and/or producer surplus created by the location choice” (Glaeser, p.11). 
Therefore, if there are agglomeration externalities or externalities linked to the demand and 
supply of goods and services,  both being the rationale for regional policies,  subsidies are an 
important policy instruments to get the efficient location of firms. Glaeser (2001, p.12) also 
notes that “more generally, tax incentives will lead to efficient, not inefficient, location of 
firms if there are heterogeneous agglomeration effects across space”. 
 
Our empirical application indicates the presence of subsidy specific spillover effects across 
areas. Therefore the  results suggest that the evaluation of the spatial effect of the policy 
intervention should be based on the spatial net effect that considers the (generally) positive 
effects on the subsidized areas but also the crowding out effect in the neighbouring areas. The 
analysis shows that incentives attract skills and growth from nearest areas. The policy maker 
should consider if it is a suitable effect and should consequently adapt the policy intervention 
(for instance, increasing the spatial concentration of the subsidies).    18 
 
Using a spatial approach, our study confirms that subsidies by Law 488/92 have a positive 
employment  impact.  The  results  are  robust  to  different  estimation  methods  and  to  the 
presence of spatial effects. Subsidies by Law 488/92 have effectively led to an increase in the 
number of employees in the subsidized  LLS  more than in the others. This is one of the 
expected effects of the incentive scheme (additional employment per unit of investment is one 
of  the  determining  indicators  for  selecting  projects).  The  analysis  suggests  that  selective 
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